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Program administrators face important trade-offs when setting up an (optimal) unemployment insur-
ance (UI) system. For instance, they must strike for a balance between the possible positive impacts
on consumption smoothing for liquidity constrained individuals and on increased match quality,
1 and
the undesired distortion to job search intensity caused by the provision of benefits. The first task is
achieved by issuing unemployment insurance, which allows workers to keep a percentage of pre-un-
employment income. But, it is precisely this insurance that, by changing the relative price of leisure,
hasanegativeimpactontheincentivetosearchforajob.UIdecreasethecostofunemploymentor, al-
ternatively, makes employment less attractive in relative terms.
2 This dimension corresponds to the
substitution effect that the literature has highlighted. However, UI can also have an income effect that
varies with the degree of liquidity constraints faced by the unemployed, generating a heterogeneous
impact on unemployment duration. If this proposition is empirically relevant, than the UI system is
fulfilling one of its primary objectives.
In this paper, we take advantage of the exogenous July 1999 legislative extension the UI entitlement
periodto assess the impact of UI on the durationof unemployment.The analyticaladvantageof this le-
gal reform is that it allows for the construction of a quasi-experimental setting.
The results show that the UI entitlement period extension prolongs subsidized unemployment spells,
but that its effect decreases, typically, with the degree of liquidity constraint (indexed by the pre-unem-
ployment wage quintiles). Thus, we identify a non-distortionary income effect of UI, generated by the
reduction in the liquidity constraints of the unemployed. The behavior of individuals in the first quintile
is the exception. The fact that individuals with the largest constraints extended the least their unem-
ploymentspellsisconsistentwithanonstationaryjobsearchmodel.Overall,theseresultssuggestthat
the extensionof the entitlement period may introduce regressive elements in the UI system by benefit-
ing the least individualsin the lowerpart of the income distribution. In normative terms, the results sug-
gest that the UI entitlement period should be shortened, as well as a decreasing function of
pre-unemployment income, similarly to the financial generosity of the system.
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(1) Belzil (2001), Centeno (2004) and Centeno and Novo (2006b) present evidence, respectively, for Canada and the United States, that a financially more
generous unemployment benefits result in better jobs, measured in terms of wage gains and job stability.
(2) Yetanotherlessdesirableimpactofunemploymentinsuranceisthecrowding-outeffectinotherformsofprivatesavings(insurance),butthatinpracticeare
difficult to measure.2. LITERATURE: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL
2.1. Theory
The main theoretical results that motivate the empirical exercise in this paper are derived from the
standard nonstationary job search model in Mortensen (1986). The simple result of observing longer
unemployment spells as a response to increased UI generosity, usually interpreted as a distortionary
substitution effect, does not precludethe existenceof a non-distortionaryincome effect for agents who
face liquidity constraints. The income effect introduces heterogeneity in the UI impact on unemploy-
ment duration for constrained and unconstrained individuals. If the income effect is important, the total
effect of UI becomes less distortionarythan previouslythought, a result recentlyemphasized in Chetty
(2007).
To add intuition for these outcomes, first we think of the workers’ liquidity constraints as in Mortensen
(1986), wherethe workeris ableto self-financethe search costs onlyfor a finite periodof time. This im-
plies that constrained workers find it more difficult to smooth consumption over labor market states,
and for them, UI might create an income effect that occurs in addition to, and independently, of the
usual substitution effect. When a constrained workerrelies on UI benefits to maintain consumption, in-
creases in the benefit generosity would reduce the pressure to find a job, without changes in the rela-
tive prices of leisure and work, therefore, in a non-distortionary form. On the contrary, if the worker is
unconstrained,the income effect channel is less relevant, since UI benefits wouldbe a small portion of
the lifetime wealth. Chart 1 illustrates this effect in a stylized way. After the increase in the entitlement
period,fromT0 toT 1, the incomeeffect willproducea largerincreasein unemploymentdurationfor con-
strained individuals() C
IE than for unconstrained() U
IE .
Notice that in Chart 1 the impact in unemployment duration is increasing. This also follows from the
nonstationary job search. At the beginning of the unemployment spell, an extension of the entitlement
period entails only small immediate disincentive effects for workers; most of the action occurs just be-
fore the benefit exhaustion in the old system. This is because extended benefits delay the spike in the
unemploymentexit rate that is characteristic of a system with time-limited UI benefits; Katz and Meyer
(1990) and Lalive et al. (2006) present evidence of these effects.
In van den Berg (1990), Mortensen’s model is extended with the inclusion of other exogenous vari-
ables, namely, the arrival rate of job offers and the wage offers distribution. All these variables can
cause nonstationarity if their values are dependent on unemployment duration. The literature on the
nonstationary job search model, recently reviewed in Eckstein and van den Berg (2007), points out to
the importance of these variables in shaping the unemploymentduration distribution, through their im-
pact on the reservation wage.The exogenous variables determine the search environment at the indi-
vidual level and, as shown in Addison et al. (2004) for a sample of European households, this
environmenthas a great deal of heterogeneityamong the unemployed.In particular, their results show
that low-wage,older and less educated workers have a lower job offers arrival rate. In turn, these indi-
vidual characteristics are highly correlated with the existence of liquidity constraints. If more con-
strained individualsface a worselabor market environment, the model predicts that they willreact less
to the increased generosity.
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128In a nutshell,ina nonstationaryenvironment,the most constrainedindividualsmayfindit difficult to ad-
just their behaviorto the increasedgenerosity. As Cahuc and Zylberberg(2006) put it, althoughlow-in-
come individuals ought to be more responsive to increased benefits, they enjoy a narrower margin of
maneuver, which may prevent them to take full advantage of the additional benefits. Thus, the relative
position of the two curves in Chart 1 – the income effect – becomes an empirical question.
2.2. Empirical evidence
There is a largebodyof empiricalliteratureestimatingthe effects of UI onlaborsupply, startingwiththe
seminal study by Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976). Nickell (1979) and Lancaster (1979) showed that
higher benefits are associated with longer unemployment spells, and these fidings were followed by a
wealth of new results that showed how this effect operates, with due attention paid to other aspects of
the UI system. The papers by Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990) were the first to show that the
hazard from unemployment is highly affected by the approximation of the UI exhaustion date, pointing
to a decreasing reservation wage.
Recently, several studies apply new developments in the treatment effects literature to explore
quasi-experimental settings generated by reforms in European countries’ regulations. However, most
studies assume homogeneous responses, as in van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) and Lalive et al.
(2006). Quantile regression techniques are applied by Kyyra and Wilke (2007) to the study of a UI re-
form in Finland and by Fitzenberger and Wilke (2007) to the characterization of unemployment dura-
tion in Germany. All these studies show that unemployed workers have larger exit rates in less
generous UI systems.
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IE. The difference between the two curves identifies the income effect.The evidence on the heterogeneity of UI impact is more scant. Gruber (1997) and Browning and
Crossley (2001) show evidence that more liquidity constrained individuals benefit the most from UI
generosity in terms of consumption changes in the unemployment state. Chetty (2007) shows that UI
raises durations primarily because of an income effect, induced by the inability to save, rather than by
moral hazard motives arising from distorted incentives.
3. METHODOLOGY
In the context of a nonstationaryjob search model, weexpectan extensionof the UI entitlementperiod
to increase the length of unemployment spells in a non-uniform way, with a larger impact occurring
around the previous entitlement period limits. If this is the case, then the predominant effect of exten-
sion should be felt in the upper part of the distribution of unemployment durations. In other words, we
expect differentiated impacts at different locations of the distribution, which can be fully captured with
quantile regression.
3.1. Quantile regression
Quantile regression, first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978), specifies and estimates a family
of conditional quantile functions, Qx X yx | (| ) ()    , where Q is the conditional quantile function ofY
given X, a vector of conditioning variables, and  is a quantile in the interval [0, 1]. In this respect,
quantile regression is similar to the rather more ubiquitous mean regression method. The least
squares estimator also specifies a linear function of conditioning variables, namely, the conditional
mean function,EY X x x [| ]   .
Thus, quantile regression has a descriptive advantage over least squares – it provides several sum-
mary statistics of the conditional distribution function, rather than just one characteristic, namely, the
mean. Ultimately, withpoint estimates of   , quantileregression allowsus to characterize and distin-
guish the effects of covariates on the upper and lowerquantiles of the distribution. Thus, if the effect of
the entitlement period extensionis felt primarilyat longer durations, then, for instance, the 75
th percen-
tile will be larger than the 25
th percentile.
Furthermore, quantile regression is very well suited for the specific duration-related questions arising
in the context of the nonstationary job search model, which we address in this paper. Recent applica-
tions of quantile regression to duration models can be found in Koenker and Bilias (2001), Machado
and Portugal (2002), Centeno and Novo (2006), Fitzenberger and Wilke (2007) and Kyyra and Wilke
(2007).
3.2. Quantile treatment effect
The concept of quantile treatment response wasfirst proposed by Lehmann (1975). In practical terms,
Lehmann’s definition is easy to implement. It is heuristically convenient to establish a parallel with the
average treatment effect on the duration of subsidized unemployment. This effect is computed as the
difference between the average duration of unemployment in the treatment group (those subjected to
the policy intervention) and the average for the control group (those not subjected to the policy inter-
vention). In the case of the median treatment effect, for instance, one starts by computing the (empiri-
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130cal) median unemployment duration for the treatment group; the procedure is repeated for the control
group. The difference between the two median durations yields the median treatment effect in the dis-
tribution of subsidized unemployment durations. Its interpretation is also rather simple; it tells us, for
the case of the median, that it would ben days higher (smaller ifn is negative) than in the absence of
treatment. For other percentilesof the distribution,the procedureand interpretation are the same. Rel-
atively to the average treatment effect, the quantile treatment effect has a descriptive advantage
because it allows us to characterize the impact of the policy along the distribution of subsidized
unemployment spells.
The observation of individuals belonging to the treatment and control groups in the periods before and
after the policy intervention allows us to refine the estimate of the quantile treatment effect. The exis-
tence of observations before and after the treatment for the control group provides an estimate of the
impact of the macroeconomic environment on the labor market outcomes. If we assume that such en-
vironmentwouldaffect equallythetreatmentgroupintheabsenceof UI entitlementextension,thenwe
should discount this value to the evolution through time of the treatment group unemployment dura-
tions. In other words, we could say that the simple difference of behavior of the treatment group be-
tween the before and after period would be contaminated/affected by effects not attributable to the UI
extension (macroeconomic effects). Thus, one must subtract the control group difference to the treat-
ment group difference, resulting in the quantile treatment effect difference-in-differences estimate.
Formally, the estimate is obtained as: for each time period, the impact of the treatment is computed as
describedin the previous paragraphand the difference betweenthe estimate for the before period and
estimate of the after period gives us the final impact (see Centeno and Novo (2007) and Koenker
(2005) for a technical discussion of the quantile treatment effect).
4. THE UI REFORM AND THE ECONOMY
4.1. The extension of some entitlement periods
The Portuguese UI legislation established only one eligibilitycriterion, namely, a minimum of 540 days
ofsocialcontributionsinthe24monthsbeforeunemployment.Benefitsarethensetasapercentageof
the 12-month average of the previous wages. Chart 2 illustrates the financial generosity of the system
expressed in terms of the gross replacement rate (GRR).
OuranalysiswillfocusontheunemployedwithGRRsof65percent,whichtranslatesroughlyintoaver-
agemonthlyearningsrangingfrom 1.5to 4.5minimumwages.
3 This choice,whilestillallowingfor sub-
stantial wagevariability, aims at guaranteeinga similar impact of the substitution effect of UI, therefore
eliminating a possible source of differentiated behavior among individuals.
4
One peculiar feature of the Portuguese system is the definition of the entitlement period, which is fully
determined by the individual’s age at the beginning of the unemployment spell. In July 1999, the enti-
tlement period increased for some age groups in the population. Before the reform, the Portuguese
legislation divided workers into 8 age-groups with different entitlement periods. The reform made this
periodlongerfor 6 out of the 8 groups, leavingthe remainingtwogroups unchanged(see Table1). The
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(3) In the data, some ratios are not exactly equal to 65 per cent, which lead us to preserve all observations withGRR in the interval [63, 67] per cent.
(4) Indeed,forGermany,FitzenbergerandWilke(2007)reportevidenceofalargedisincentiveeffectsonlaborsupplyattributabletohighreplacementrates.pre-1999 duration of benefits ranged from a minimum of 10 months for those aged less than 25 to a
maximum of 30 months for those aged 55 or more. The newlegislation changed the lowerbound to 12
months, while the upper bound increased to up to 38 months.
The methodology used to estimate the impact of the new legislation consists in defining two groups
from the population with different exposure to the legislation: (i) the age group [30, 34], whose entitle-
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minimum wage have GRR of 100 per cent; individuals with average income greater than 4.5 minimum wages receive UI benefits worth 3 minimum wages.
Table 1
ENTITLEMENT PERIODS (IN MONTHS) BEFORE AND AFTER JULY, 1999
Before After
Age (years)
(a) Entitlement period Age (years)
(a) Entitlement period
[15, 24] 10
[15, 29] 12 [25, 29] 12
[30, 34] 15
[30, 39] 18 [35, 39] 18






Notes:(a)Ageatthebeginningoftheunemploymentspell.(b)Forunemployedaged45ormore,2additionalmonthsofUIcanbeclaimedforeach5yearswithsocialcontributions.ment period increased from 15 months to 18 months and (ii) the age group [35, 39], whoseentitlement
period remained unchanged at 18 months. The first group is identified as the treatment group and the
second as the control group.
These two groups are particularly comparable given the age proximity and the fact that, after the re-
form, they share the same entitlement period. Indeed, the treatment group, [30, 34], is likely to share
similar labor market characteristics with the [35, 39] control group, for instance, in terms of schooling,
marital status and child-bearing decisions. In our case, this ex-ante comparability gains additional im-
portance because of the limited information on workers’ characteristics available in the dataset.
4.2. Economic conditions
At the moment of the reform, the Portuguese labor market and the economy were buoyant (see Table
2). In the periodjust prior the reform, real GDPgrowthexceeded4 percent and employmentwasgrow-
ing consistently above 2 percent. The unemployment rate was at or below 5 percent, showingsigns of
a tight labor market situation.
The business cycle started to change only in the second half of 2001, with both GDP and employment
growth rates declining. This is also visible in the turning point in unemployment.
It is worth noting that the good economic conditions prevailing at the moment of the reform are favor-
able for our empirical strategy. Indeed, they suggest that the policy change was not driven endoge-
nously by the evolution of the labor market. Furthermore, the groups studied, prime-age workers,
usually suffer less with labor market swings and do not face the type of retirement decisions common
to older workers. This makes our comparison of pre-and post-reform outcomes more convincing, as it
is not driven by a specific trend in the labor market or to questions related with population ageing. By
the same token, we need to exercise caution when extrapolating the results for the population. The
specificityof the studiedgroupandthe distinctcharacteristicsof the remainingpopulationarepotential
external threats to the validity of these results for the population.
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Sources: National accounts, INE; Inquérito ao Emprego, INE.
Table 2
THE PORTUGUESE ECONOMY BEFORE AND AFTER JULY, 1999






1997 4.2 1.9 5.8 43.6
1998 4.7 2.3 5.0 45.4
1999 3.9 1.9 4.4 41.2
2000 3.9 2.3 3.9 43.8
2001 2.0 1.5 4.0 40.0
2002 0.8 0.5 5.0 37.3
2003 -1.2 -0.4 6.3 37.7
2004 1.1 0.1 6.7 46.25. DATA
Our study is based on administrative data collected by the Portuguese government’s agency Instituto
de Informática da Segurança Social (IISS). The dataset recorded all subsidized unemployment spells
initiated between January 1, 1998 and June 30, 2003, which we are able to follow until they are termi-
nated,eitherbeforeorontheexhaustiondate.The datasetcontainsverydetailedandreliableinforma-
tion on the type, amount and duration of benefits and the previous wage. The socio-demographic
variables available are limited to gender, age, nationality and place of residence. However, the avail-
ability of the previous wage allows us to partially overcome the problem posed by the lack of more de-
tailed individual characteristics. Table 3 contains descriptive summary statistics of the key variables
before the reform.
With the aforementioned restriction of GRRs to the interval [63, 67] per cent, we have a total of 40,982
subsidizedunemploymentspells.The treatmentgroupcomprises23,226observations,ofwhich3,145
are from the period before July 1999. The control group has 3,631 observations in the before period
and 14,125 in the after period. The differences in the 12-month average values of real previous wages
between treatment and control groups are minor.
Asimpledifference-in-differences(D-in-D)estimate yieldsan impact on subsidizedunemploymentdu-
ration for the treated group of approximately 83 days (see Table 4). The interpretation of this result is
straight forward: if there was not an extension of the UI entitlement period, individuals aged 30 to 34,
who benefited from a 90 days extension, would, on average, spent 83 days less in subsidized
unemployment.
The analysisof survivalrates, Kaplan-Meyerestimates(Chart3), confirmstheseresults andillustrates
the quality of the quasi-natural experiment. The before-after difference between the two curves drawn
for the treatment group suggests that the reform significantlyincreasedthe survival rates in unemploy-
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Sources: IISS. Authors’ computations.
Note:(a)The pre-unemployment wage foreach individual iscomputed as the 12-month average of wages reported inthe period that precedes unemployment in2 months. Real wages
expressed in 1999 euros.
Table 3
SUMMARY STATISTICS: BEFORE JULY, 1999
Treatment Control
Age (in years) 31.88 36.94
Proportion of women 0.34 0.35
Real wage
(a)
Full sample 696.27 726.42
1
st wage quintile 496.08 500.55
2
nd wage quintile 583.11 581.83
3
rd wage quintile 681.58 681.69
4
th wage quintile 838.11 842.51
5
th wage quintile 1 160.99 1 191.24
Minimum 353.10 350.10
Maximum 1 487.55 1 561.98
Number of observations 3 145 3 631ment. The same exercise for the control group results in virtually imperceptible differences in the sur-
vival rates, which reinforces our case for an exogenouslydriven reform. Using this difference to adjust
for aggregate conditions, we compute a simple D-in-D estimator from these Kaplan-Meyer survival
rates. The D-in-D estimates show a positive impact of the reform on subsidized unemployment dura-
tion of the treated group.In viewof the wealthof previousempiricalevidence,these results are nothing
but expected. Notice that, as predicted by theoryfor the case of an extensionin the entitlement period,
the impact is larger at longer durations (closer to the previous entitlement period).
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Sources: IISS. Authors’ computations.
Table 4
IMPACT ON THE DURATION OF SUBSIDIZED UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES
ESTIMATES
Treatment Control
Before After Before After
Average duration of unemployment (in days) 210.58 291.16 321.95 319.68
Differences 80.57 -2.27
Difference-in-differences 82.84
Number of observations 3 145 20 081 3 631 14 125
Chart 3
SUBSIDIZED UNEMPLOYMENT SURVIVAL RATES
Sources: IISS. Authors’ computations.
Note:Estimates based on the Kaplan-Meyer’s estimator. The impact of the extension is measured by the dif-
ferenceinthesurvivalratesbetweenthe4groupsanditisrepresentedbythe“D-in-D”line,atthebottomofthe
chart, with a 95 per cent interval drawn around it.6. INCOME EFFECT: CAUSAL INFERENCE EVIDENCE
In order to establish the heterogeneous impact of the increased generosity of the UI system and, in
particular,toidentifytheincomeeffect, wenowexploreourdatainadifferentfashion.Wesplitthesam-
ple by degrees of liquidity constraints and use quantile regression tools to capture the nonstationary
nature of the duration process. An assessment of the financial costs of the reform is also provided.
6.1. Measuring liquidity constraints
The identification of the income effect rests on individual differences in the degrees of liquidity con-
straints. To capture such differences, we split the sample into three subsamples, using the 12-month
average of pre-unemployment wages as an index for the distribution of liquidity constraints. We resort
to wages because our data lacks the information on asset holdings for the unemployed, a more direct
measure of their degree of liquidity constraints. The quality of pre-unemployment wages as an index
for the distributionof savingsin the Portugueseeconomycan be assessedwithdata from the Inquérito
ao Patrimómio e Endividamento das Famiílas (IPEF) for 2000, a household assets and debt survey.




rd quintiles, and the 4
th and 5
th quintilesfor the full sample of unemployedaged 30 to 39 (in
2000 prices). For each of the 3 subsamples, which we will refer to as bottom, intermediate and top
wages subsamples, the last two columns report the average level of financial assets hold by each
group, respectively, as (i) a percentage of the average level of financial assets for the IPEF sample
aged [30, 39], and (ii) as a percentage of the median wagelevel of each group. The three groups differ
clearly in terms of their financial assets holdings, suggesting that previous wages are a good index for
the degree of constraint. For instance, the bottom wages group holds financial assets worth only 2.9
group-median wages, while the remaining groups hold assets worth 4.5 and 7.5 times the respective
group median wage.
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Table 5












st quintile 358.15 533.00 551.73 0.18 2.90
2
nd and 3
rd quintiles 551.74 634.50 757.76 0.34 4.52
4
th and 5
th quintiles 757.77 980.68 1 655.10 0.87 7.51
Sources: IPEF, 2000. Authors’ computations.
Notes:(a)AverageleveloffinancialassetsexpressedinpercentageoftheaverageleveloffinancialassetsforthesampleofIPEFindividualsaged30to39.(b)Averageleveloffinancial
assets expressed as a percentage of the median wage level of each group.6.2. Quantile treatment effects
The qualityofthequasi-experimentalsettingofwasconfirmedinthepreviousanalysis.However,there
are possible confounding factors that can be controlled for with quantile regression. The primary rea-
son for using this method is to unveil potential heterogeneousresponses to changes in the entitlement
generosity of the UI system over the unemployment duration distribution, a result that follows from
nonstationarity job search theory.
The quantile regression model assumes that the logarithm of subsidized unemployment days, log( ) T ,
has linear conditional quantile functions,Q, of the form:
Q After Treat After x T log( )() () () () ()           01 2 3 Treat X 
' () 
where After is an indicator variable for the after-July 1999 period, Treat indicates the age group af-
fected bythe newlegislation,and, therefore, the coefficient on After x Treat identifiesthe impact of the
legislation. Additionally, the vector X includes the followinglist of variables: logarithm of the pre-unem-
ployment wages; logarithm of the individual’s age at the beginning of the unemployment spell; a gen-
der (female) indicator; regional (22 districts) dummies; and indicators of the month in which the
unemployment spell started. This model is estimated for each of the 3 wages-based subsamples.
The estimation results are presented in a concise format in Chart 4. Each column of panels presents
thequantileregressionestimatesfor eachof the3subsamples(from most to leastconstrained).
5 Each
panel depicts the point estimates of the coefficient associated with the respective variable for each
quantile. We chose to limit our attention to the quantiles [0.15, 0.70], ignoring, in practice, the very
short duration (less than 2 months) and the longer durations (more than 470 days). The shaded areas
represent 90 percent confidence intervals.
To highlight the differences in the treatment effect across the degrees of liquidity constraints, we pres-
ent these 3 curves together in Chart 5. The most constrained reacted the least at all durations, al-
though the impact increases over the unemployment spell. For the intermediate group, the impact is
the largest, with point estimates hovering 0.4, i.e., an increase in the duration of unemployment of ap-
proximately 40 per cent. Finally, the unconstrained group has impacts larger than those observed for
the most constrained, but always lower than for the intermediate group. The graph confirms the exis-
tence of two levels of heterogeneity: between degrees of liquidity constraints and within each group
along the distribution of subsidized unemployment spells.
These results have multiple interpretations. First, notice that there is evidence of differentiated behav-
ior between the subsamples of intermediate and top pre-unemployment wages. At all durations of un-
employment, and in response to the same incentive, the impact on the more constrained group is
larger. This conforms to the idea that there is an important income effect dimension to the UI system.
Secondly, the behavior of individualsat the bottom wagesquintile yieldstwointeresting results. First, it
has the smallest reactionto the increasedgenerosityat all durations.However, it also has the steepest
increaseuntilthemedianduration.Bothresultscanbeexplainedinthecontextofthenonstationaryjob
searchmodel.These workersaretheleastableto anticipatetheeffect of a benefitextension,butgiven
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(5) To preserve space, we omitted from this plot the results on the month and region indicator variables.their degree of liquidity constraint, they should remain quite responsive as the unemployment spell
progresses. This brings us to another key feature of the results.
6.3. The financial cost and the redistributive impact
Assessing the financial cost of the reform is of great economic interest. Ultimately, for the country’s
public finances, longer unemployment spells increase the financial burden of the system. In order to
evaluate the extra costs, it is necessary to first express the impact in terms of additional subsidized
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Chart 4
QUANTILE REGRESSION ESTIMATES BY LEVEL OF LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT
Sources: IISS. Authors’ computations.
Note: Regression quantile models for the dependent variable log(duration) by level of liquidity constraints. The first column depicts estimates for individuals with pre-unemployment
wagesinthefirstquintile;thesecondcolumnforindividualswithpre-unemploymentwagesinthe2ndand3rdquintiles;andthethirdcolumnforindividualswithpre-unemploymentwagesin
the 4th and 5th quintiles of the wage distribution.days. This can be adequately done by using the equivariance to monotone transformations of
quantiles, which allows us to transform back into days the estimated impacts inlog( ) days .
Chart 6 presents in days the QTE for the same quantiles shown before. For the bottom and top
subsamples, the median duration increased by slightly over 90 days, close to the entitlement exten-
sion, but by almost 130 days for the intermediate subsample.
It is now possible to approximate the additional financial burden to the public UI system. To do that, at
each unemployment duration (quantile) and for each subsample, we compute the average daily UI re-
ceived bythe unemployed.For instance, for the bottom wagesgroup and for individualswholeft the UI
system at the median duration, the average dailyUI received amounted to 10.91 euros. Then, wemul-
tiply the daily UI by the QTE expressed in days. For this group the extension was 93 days, therefore,
the additional financial costs were 1,014.45 euros. For the remaining groups, the intermediate and top
wagegroups, thefinancialimpact was1,830.61and1,907.33euros(in1999prices),respectively. This
represents a substantial increase in cost for the system, which expressed in terms of the average UI
paid to the unemployed in the bottom wage quintile represents, respectively, 82.4 and 85.9 per cent.
6
In other words, with the additional financial resources spent with these groups, the UI system could
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Chart 5
PERCENTAGE QUANTILE TREATMENT EFFECT ON THE
DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSIDIZED UNEMPLOYMENT DURATIONS
Sources: IISS. Authors’ computations.
Note:The logarithmic variation approximates the percentage impact on the duration of subsidized unemployment, for in-
stance, the 40th percentile  040 . in the distribution of unemployment spells for individuals with the largest liquidity
constraints increased approximately 25 per cent due to the entitlement extension.
(6) See Centeno and Novo (2007) for additional details, in particular, for computations at other percentiles of the distribution of subsidized unemployment.have financed a full spell of unemployment with median duration for an individual in the bottom wages
group.
These results showthat the majorityof the additionalfinancial resources weredirected towardsunem-
ployed who had higher wages before unemployment. Besides the differences in the amount of UI re-
ceived,thisresultisassociatedwiththelowestextensionof theperiodof subsidizedunemploymentfor
individualswiththelowestwages.GiventhattheGRRarethesameforallindividualsconsideredinthe
study, this phenomenon reflects itself in the regressiveness of the UI system. Thus, the UI transfers
promoted by the system favor individuals with higher income.
The UI system contains regressive characteristics applicable to the population of UI beneficiaries. In
practice, the longer durations of subsidized unemployment are observed for individuals with higher
pre-unemployment income. Thus, the fact that these individuals also have longer subsidized unem-
ployment spells accentuates the disparity of UI expenses. Chart 7 plots a Lorenz curve, used to mea-
sure inequality; the larger the area between the two curves, the larger the inequality. In the 2000 to
2006period,thisarea,measuredbytheGinicoefficient,is0.43(with0indicatingperfectequalityand1
perfect inequality).Not surprisingly, the current UI system has a degree of inequalitythat is larger than
the wage inequality, which has a value of 0.34. The data show that 10 per cent of the unemployed re-
ceive approximately 30 per cent of the outlays with UI, while 35 per cent of the unemployed less
subsidized receive only 10 per cent of the total UI outlays.
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Chart 6
QUANTILE TREATMENT EFFECT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF
SUBSIDIZED UNEMPLOYMENT DURATIONS, EXPRESSED IN DAYS
Sources: IISS. Authors’ computations.
Note: The median (0.50) of the distribution of subsidized unemployment durations for individuals with the largest liquidity
constraints increased 93 days due to the entitlement extension.7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper addresses the question of how the generosity of the UI entitlement period affects the dura-
tion of subsidized unemployment.The agenda for unemploymentinsurance reform points, without ex-
ception, towards a significant reduction of its generosity in order to limit moral hazard problems, which
ultimately lead to longer unemployment spells. However, the non-distortionary income effect of UI has
been neglected. This income effect generates a significant heterogeneous UI impact over the wages
distribution, associated with differences in the degrees of liquidity constraints faced by workers. We
stress that these effects operate in a nonstationary job search environment, which ultimately strongly
influences the observed behavior of individuals with worse labor market prospects, usually those who
face tight liquidity constraints.
The identification of the effect relies on a reform of the Portuguese UI system introduced in July 1999,
which extended significantly the entitlement periods for some age groups of the population, while
maintaining the same benefit limit for other (adjacent) age groups. The treatment group is composed
of individuals in the age group that benefited from the extension (30-34 years old, from 15 to 18
months) and the control group by individuals aged 35-39 years, whose entitlement period remained
constant (exactly at 18 months).
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Chart 7
LORENZ CURVE FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF UI BENEFITS PAID
BETWEEN 2000 AND 2006
Note:Thevalueoftheareabetweenthetwocurves,designatedastheGinicoefficient,measuresthedegreeofinequality
in the GRR (unemployment insurance); the larger the Gini coefficient, which varies between 0 and 1, the larger the in-
equality. In the data, the Gini coefficient is 0.43, while for the distribution of wages the coefficient is 0.34.We present evidenceof a heterogeneousimpact on the durationof subsidizedunemployment.The re-
sults pointtowardstheexistenceofanimportantincomeeffect, identifiedbyastrongerreactiontogen-
erosity by individuals in the intermediate wages group (2
nd and 3
rd wage quintiles). Individuals in the
bottom wage quintile increased the least their unemployment spells, which constitutes an interesting
result in light of the nonstationary job search models.
This result showsthat a UI system that is very generous in the duration of the benefits can become fis-
cally regressive, because the extension in the entitlement ends up benefiting the least individuals at
the bottom of the wage distribution. Given the smaller reaction of these individuals, who are more af-
fected by the nonstationarity in the labor market environment, the weight of UI expenses with this
group of individuals decreases.
The results point towardsthe importance of changing the UI concession rules. In this context, one pro-
posal would set shorter entitlement periods and set them as a decreasing function of pre-unemploy-
ment income. Complementarily, to reach a higher impact of the income effect, it is preferable to
increasethefinancialgenerosityoftheUItowardsthemostconstrained,ratherthangrantingthemlon-
ger entitlement periods, which they find harder to take up.
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